17 research outputs found
Strategyproof and fair matching mechanism for ratio constraints
We introduce a new type of distributional constraints called ratio constraints, which explicitly specify the required balance among schools in two-sided matching. Since ratio constraints do not belong to the known well-behaved class of constraints called M-convex set, developing a fair and strategyproof mechanism that can handle them is challenging. We develop a novel mechanism called quota reduction deferred acceptance (QRDA), which repeatedly applies the standard DA by sequentially reducing artificially introduced maximum quotas. As well as being fair and strategyproof, QRDA always yields a weakly better matching for students compared to a baseline mechanism called artificial cap deferred acceptance (ACDA), which uses predetermined artificial maximum quotas. Finally, we experimentally show that, in terms of student welfare and nonwastefulness, QRDA outperforms ACDA and another fair and strategyproof mechanism called Extended Seat Deferred Acceptance (ESDA), in which ratio constraints are transformed into minimum and maximum quotas
Student-Project-Resource Matching-Allocation Problems: Game Theoretic Analysis
In this work, we consider a three sided student-project-resource matching-allocation problem, in which students have preferences on projects, and projects on students. While students are many-to-one matched to projects, indivisible resources are many-to-one allocated to projects whose capacities are thus endogenously determined by the sum of resources allocated to them. Traditionally, this problem is divided into two separate problems: (1) resources are allocated to projects based on some expectations (resource allocation problem), and (2) students are matched to projects based on the capacities determined in the previous problem (matching problem). Although both problems are well-understood, unless the expectations used in the first problem are correct, we obtain a suboptimal outcome. Thus, it is desirable to solve this problem as a whole without dividing it in two.
In this paper, we first show that a stable (i.e., fair and nonwasteful) matching does not exist in general (nonwastefulness is a criterion related to efficiency). Then, we show that no strategyproof mechanism satisfies fairness and very weak efficiency requirements. Given this impossibility result, we develop a new strategyproof mechanism that strikes a good balance between fairness and efficiency, which is assessed by experiments
Multi-Stage Generalized Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: Strategyproof Mechanism for Handling General Hereditary Constraints
The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied
to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to
increasingly diverse types of environments, researchers and practitioners have
encountered various forms of distributional constraints. Arguably, the most
general class of distributional constraints would be hereditary constraints; if
a matching is feasible, then any matching that assigns weakly fewer students at
each college is also feasible. However, under general hereditary constraints,
it is shown that no strategyproof mechanism exists that simultaneously
satisfies fairness and weak nonwastefulness, which is an efficiency (students'
welfare) requirement weaker than nonwastefulness. We propose a new
strategyproof mechanism that works for hereditary constraints called the
Multi-Stage Generalized Deferred Acceptance mechanism (MS-GDA). It uses the
Generalized Deferred Acceptance mechanism (GDA) as a subroutine, which works
when distributional constraints belong to a well-behaved class called
hereditary M-convex set. We show that GDA satisfies several
desirable properties, most of which are also preserved in MS-GDA. We
experimentally show that MS-GDA strikes a good balance between fairness and
efficiency (students' welfare) compared to existing strategyproof mechanisms
when distributional constraints are close to an M-convex set.Comment: 23 page
Comparisons between QRDA and ACDA under difference constraints: Ratio of students who strictly prefer QRDA to ACDA.
denotes the values when θ = 0.1 and denotes the values when θ = 0.3.</p
Comparisons between QRDA and ESDA under difference constraints: Ratio of students who strictly prefer QRDA to ESDA.
denotes the values when θ = 0.1 and denotes the values when θ = 0.3.</p
Notations used in this paper.
We identify a new class of distributional constraints defined as a union of symmetric M-convex sets, which can represent a wide range of real-life constraints in two-sided matching settings. Since M-convexity is not closed under union, a union of symmetric M-convex sets does not belong to this well-behaved class of constraints. Consequently, devising a fair and strategyproof mechanism to handle this new class is challenging. We present a novel mechanism for it called Quota Reduction Deferred Acceptance (QRDA), which repeatedly applies the standard Deferred Acceptance mechanism by sequentially reducing artificially introduced maximum quotas. We show that QRDA is fair and strategyproof when handling a union of symmetric M-convex sets, which extends previous results obtained for a subclass of the union of symmetric M-convex sets: ratio constraints. QRDA always yields a weakly better matching for students than a baseline mechanism called Artificial Cap Deferred Acceptance (ACDA). We also experimentally show that QRDA outperforms ACDA in terms of nonwastefulness.</div
Comparisons between QRDA and ACDA under flexible uniform min/max quotas constraints: Ratio of students who strictly prefer QRDA to ACDA by varying <i>d</i>.
denotes the values when θ = 0.1 and denotes the values when θ = 0.3.</p
Inclusion of notions in discrete convex analysis.
We identify a new class of distributional constraints defined as a union of symmetric M-convex sets, which can represent a wide range of real-life constraints in two-sided matching settings. Since M-convexity is not closed under union, a union of symmetric M-convex sets does not belong to this well-behaved class of constraints. Consequently, devising a fair and strategyproof mechanism to handle this new class is challenging. We present a novel mechanism for it called Quota Reduction Deferred Acceptance (QRDA), which repeatedly applies the standard Deferred Acceptance mechanism by sequentially reducing artificially introduced maximum quotas. We show that QRDA is fair and strategyproof when handling a union of symmetric M-convex sets, which extends previous results obtained for a subclass of the union of symmetric M-convex sets: ratio constraints. QRDA always yields a weakly better matching for students than a baseline mechanism called Artificial Cap Deferred Acceptance (ACDA). We also experimentally show that QRDA outperforms ACDA in terms of nonwastefulness.</div
Comparisons between QRDA and ACDA under flexible uniform min/max quotas constraints: Ratio of students who strictly prefer QRDA to ACDA by varying <i>p</i>.
denotes the values when θ = 0.1 and denotes the values when θ = 0.3.</p
Comparisons between QRDA and ESDA under difference constraints: Difference between ratio of claiming students in QRDA and in ESDA.
denotes the values when θ = 0.1 and denotes the values when θ = 0.3.</p